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Abstract 
Thought speed and variability are purportedly common features of specific 
psychological states, such as mania and anxiety. The present study explored the 
independent and combinational influence of these variables upon condition-specific 
symptoms and affective state, as proposed by Pronin and Jacobs’ (2008) theory of 
mental motion. A general population sample was recruited online (N = 263). 
Participants completed a thought speed and variability manipulation task, inducing a 
combination of fast/slow and varied/repetitive thought. Change in mania and anxiety 
symptoms was assessed through direct self-reported symptom levels and indirect, 
processing bias assessment (threat interpretation). Results indicated that fast and 
varied thought independently increased self-reported mania symptoms. Affect was 
significantly less positive and more negative during slow thought. No change in 
anxiety symptoms or threat interpretation was found between manipulation 
conditions. No evidence for the proposed combinational influence of speed and 
variability was found. Implications and avenues for therapeutic intervention are 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
Accumulating evidence suggests that attributes depicting the way one thinks 
may play a fundamental role in the manifestation of psychological conditions (e.g., 
Brunyé, Gagnon, Paczynski, Shenhav, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2013; Drost, van der 
Does, van Hemert, Penninx, & Spinhoven, 2014; Mason & Bar, 2011; McLaughlin, 
Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007; Pronin, 2013; Watkins, 2008). Experimental induction of 
thinking styles symptomatic of specific conditions has been demonstrated to impact 
on psychological state. For instance, inducing the rumination associated with 
depression may increase depression levels and inducing the worry associated with 
anxiety may increase negative affect (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993). Consequently, the way one thinks may not simply reflect features of 
specific psychological difficulties; it may directly contribute to those difficulties.  
Pronin and Jacobs’ (2008) model of mental motion proposes the potential 
importance of two particular movement-based attributes of thought, namely speed 
and variability. Thought speed refers to the pace of thinking, whereas thought 
variability refers to the interconnectivity between thoughts (i.e., their uniqueness or 
repetitiveness). The mental motion account predicts condition-specific symptoms are 
causally related to the behaviour of these two attributes of thought.  
Experimental manipulation of both attributes has been associated with 
differences in psychological state (see Pronin & Jacobs, 2008, for example 
manipulations). Thought acceleration has been associated with increased positive 
affect (Pronin, Jacobs, & Wegner, 2008; Yang, Friedman-Wheeler, & Pronin, 2014) 
as well as greater risk-taking compared to slow thought (Chandler & Pronin, 2012). 
Thought variability has also been associated with specific psychological outcomes 
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(see Watkins, 2008, for review). Narrow associative thinking (i.e., thoughts revolving 
around a narrow topic) may decrease positive affect, whereas broad progressive 
thinking (i.e., thoughts that are related but developing in thematic focus) may 
decrease negative affect (Mason & Bar, 2011). The role of thought content in 
psychological conditions is acknowledged; however, the characteristics of mental 
motion are proposed to exert additional content-independent effects (Pronin & 
Jacobs, 2008).  
The proposed effects of mental motion may be evolutionarily advantageous: 
facilitating mobilisation and activation in emergency situations that induce quick 
thinking (Pronin, 2013) and promoting learning/problem-solving through varied 
thinking by increasing positive affect (Bar, 2009). Conversely, depression, which is 
associated with slow ruminative thinking, has been hypothesised to encourage 
inactivity where action is counterproductive (Nesse, 2000). 
The influence of thought speed and variability is posited to be both individual 
and combinational. Individually, specific changes in either thought speed or 
variability are suggested to cause changes in psychological state consistent with 
specific conditions (e.g., anxiety, depression, and mania). However, the influence of 
mental motion may be best understood in terms of specific combinations of thought 
speed and variability (see Pronin & Jacobs, 2008, Fig. 1). The model predicts that 
depressive states may be induced by slow, repetitive thought; whereas anxious and 
manic states share increased thought speed but may be differentiated by thought 
variability. Anxiety is predicted as involving fast, repetitive thought, whereas mania 
involves fast, varied thought. Although untested as yet, it is plausible that specific 
cognitive processing biases consistent with specific conditions (e.g., Mogg & 
Bradley, 2005) may also be induced through manipulation of these variables.  
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Consequently, the model provides a framework in which individuals 
experiencing different psychological conditions may exhibit both convergence and 
divergence in attributes of their thinking style. This proposition has potential 
relevance to transdiagnostic models of psychological difficulties, which suggest core 
underlying thought processes may feature across multiple conditions. Consideration 
of the combinational, as well as individual, influences of different attributes of 
different thinking styles is one avenue that may contribute to developing our 
understanding how transdiagnostic psychological risk factors can lead to divergent 
trajectories and multifinality (see Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011).  
Whilst the outlined evidence supports the individual influence of thought 
speed and variability on psychological state, the proposed combinational influence 
has received limited investigation. In a pace-controlled reading task of neutral trivia 
statements, Pronin and Jacobs (2008) manipulated combinations of thought speed 
and variability in 74 participants. No interactive effect of thought speed and variability 
was demonstrated on affective state. However, repetitive thought was associated 
with more feelings of depression than anxiety when thought was slow and with more 
feelings of anxiety than depression when fast. The latter thinking style also predicted 
higher levels of felt energy. The reported effects using neutral stimuli support the 
proposed content-independent influence of mental motion. However, the study 
provided inconclusive support for the proposed combinational influence of these 
variables as not all predicted outcomes were evidenced and the reported significant 
interaction effects related to differences between levels of anxiety and depression 
rather than within each condition – complicating interpretation of where change 
occurred.  
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Research replicating and extending investigation beyond this single study is 
warranted. Further investigation exploring the differentiating role of thought speed 
and variability in determining specific psychological conditions is necessary. In 
particular, the proposed combinational effects of thought speed and variability in 
generating mania and anxiety symptoms is largely untested and requires empirical 
evaluation. Providing this evaluation was the primary focus of the present research. 
The Present Research 
The present study was a larger scale replication of the pace-controlled 
reading experimental design developed by Pronin and colleagues, outlined above 
(Pronin & Jacobs, 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006). This study extended previous 
investigation through more detailed focus on the proposed individual and 
combinational influence of mental motion variables on mania and anxiety symptoms. 
In addition, affective state has frequently featured in previous research and has 
provided relatively consistent evidence. Consequently, assessment of affect was 
included to enable reliability comparison with existing evidence.  
The study employed validated clinical self-report measures of condition 
symptoms alongside indirect symptom assessment through cognitive processing 
bias. Processing biases are posited to be instrumental in the maintenance of 
psychological difficulties (e.g., Clark, 1999) and differentiable between conditions 
(e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Consequently, this study included assessment of 
condition-specific threat interpretation bias as an additional, more objective, 
assessment of condition symptoms. Evidence suggests that processing biases 
commonly present in anxiety as unconscious, uncontrollable propensities towards 
threat perception (Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012). However, whilst 
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mania may be associated with decreased threat sensitivity, evidence is inconsistent 
(Carver & Johnson, 2009). Consequently, this study component was exploratory.  
Based on theory and evidence outlined, the following primary and secondary 
research questions were developed: 
Primary research question. Are specific manipulations and combinations of 
thought speed and variability associated with condition-specific symptoms of mania 
and anxiety, as predicted by the model of mental motion?  
Hypothesis one. It was predicted that increased thought speed would be 
associated with increased self-reported levels of mania symptoms, particularly when 
thought was varied; and increased self-reported levels of anxiety symptoms, 
particularly when thought was repetitive. 
Hypothesis two.  As anxiety is associated with increased threat perception 
(Mogg & Bradley, 2005), it was predicted that fast, repetitive thought would also be 
associated with increased levels of threat interpretation. 
Hypothesis three. Symptoms of mania may be associated with decreased 
threat sensitivity; however, evidence is inconsistent (Carver & Johnson, 2009). 
Consequently, it was tentatively predicted that fast, variable thought would be 
associated with decreased levels of threat interpretation.  
Secondary research question. Are specific manipulations of thought speed 
and variability associated with affective state consistent with the model of mental 
motion and previous research findings? 
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Hypothesis four. Based on previous research, it was predicted that both 
faster and more variable thought would be associated with higher level of positive 
affect. 
Hypothesis five. The mental motion model predicted that both slower and 
more repetitive thought would be associated with higher levels of negative affect 
(i.e., simulating depressive rumination). However, previous research has 
inconsistently demonstrated significant association between negative affect and 
these variables (Pronin et al., 2008).  
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and sixty-three participants comprised the final sample post 
data-screening. Participants were an opportunity sample of adults (≥ 18 years) 
recruited from the general population through online advertising and advert 
circulation within a selection of UK universities. Demographic information is 
summarised in Table 1. 
A subsection of participants (n = 78) were university students recruited 
through an online participant pool and awarded course credit for participation. 
Baseline differences between this subsection and remaining participants were 
explored during data-screening and accounted for in the analyses. 
Comparison of final study participant raw data and study non-completers was 
conducted through Chi-square and independent t-tests – Table 1. Of the 603 
participants comprising the full dataset, up to 567 participants provided baseline data 
and could be employed in this comparison. Significant differences in sex, age, and 
employment status were found. Levene’s test indicated unequal variances for age, 
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F(1, 565) = 4.76, p = .030, and PANAS NA, F(1, 461) = 13.42, p ≤ .001, only. The 
adjusted t-test statistic was consulted for these two variables. Overall, no significant 
differences between completers and non-completers were revealed by t-tests on 
dependent variables (ts ≤ 1.39; ps ≥ .167), with the exception of PANAS NA, 
t(368.78) = 2.24, p = .026, equal variances not assumed. Non-completers reported 
higher levels of negative affect (M = 17.73, SE = .59) compared to completers (M = 
16.11, SE = .41). Overall, despite demographic differences between the compared 
groups, baseline performance on dependent variables used for repeat measurement 
appeared equivalent. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Measures and Materials1 
Internal State Scale (ISS; Bauer et al., 1991). Self-reported activation level 
was assessed using the ISS. Activation was selected as a mania symptom because 
it is considered a common and core factor underpinning the range of mania 
symptoms (see Mansell & Pedley, 2008). Additionally, the ISS: activation subscale 
correlates positively with clinical assessment of mania. 
The ISS includes 15 items comprising four subscales: activation, well-being, 
depression, and perceived conflict. Participants endorse items (e.g., Right now I feel 
impulsive) on 0-100% agreement scale. Subscales have good internal consistency 
(α = .81 to .92). This study utilised activation (5 items) and wellbeing (3 items) 
                                                          
1 Three additional measures respectively assessing trait vulnerability towards mania 
(Hypomanic Personality Scale; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), anxiety (State-Trait 
Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety; Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 
2007), and cognitive fusion (Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire; Gillanders et al., 2014) 
were also employed at baseline. However, they are not reported here as they pertain 
to a research question outside of those specified in the present study. 
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subscales only. ISS: activation subscale scores can be combined wellbeing subscale 
scores to provide dichotomous categorisation of mood state for (hypo)manic, mixed 
state, euthymic, and depressive states, respectively (Bauer, Vojta, Kinosian, 
Altschuler, & Glick, 2000). 
Instructions were modified to assess current state rather than last 24 hours. 
This modification has been employed elsewhere (e.g., Taylor & Mansell, 2008). 
Cronbach’s α = .82 (activation) and .78 (well-being) in the present study. 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – short-form (STAI-sf; Marteau 
& Bekker, 1992). Self-reported anxiety symptoms were assessed using the STAI-sf. 
The STAI-sf is a six-item short-form of the original STAI (Spielberg, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Participants endorse items (e.g., I feel calm) on a 
4-point likert-scale (1 = not at all; 4 = very much). Authors report good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .82) and comparability to the full STAI. Compared to 
alternative short-form versions, the STAI-sf demonstrates the best reliability and 
validity in correlation with the full STAI (Tluczek, Henriques, & Brown, 2009). 
Cronbach’s α = .86 in the present study. 
 Ambiguous Scenarios Test (AST; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Threat 
interpretation was assessed using the AST. The test consists of 20 short threat-
ambiguous scenarios – 10 pre and 10 post manipulation. For each scenario, 
participants are presented with two sentences providing differing interpretations of 
the scenario: one threatening interpretation (As you speak, people in the audience 
find your efforts laughable) and one neutral/benign interpretation (As you speak, 
people in the audience laugh appreciatively). Participants rate both interpretations on 
a 4-point likert scale in terms of how similar to the meaning of the scenario they 
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thought each interpretation was (1 = very different in meaning; 4 = very similar in 
meaning). Only ratings of the threat interpretation were employed in the present 
study analyses as these data relate most specifically to the research question. 
Scenarios in each set of 10 were presented in the same order and the sets 
counterbalanced between participants (consistent with Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & 
Mackintosh, 2010). 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS is a 20-item measure of positive affect (PA) and negative affect 
(NA). Items are endorsed on the extent that they relate to present mood on a 5-point 
likert-scale (e.g., Interested: 1 = very slight or not at all; 5 = extremely). Authors 
report good internal consistency (PA, α = .89; NA, α = .85) and construct validity 
through correlation with depression and anxiety measures. Cronbach’s α = .9 (PA) 
and .87 (NA) for the present study. The PANAS was employed to support the validity 
of utilising two brief mood items to assess state affect – detailed below. 
 Brief mood items. Self-reported affect was assessed by single-item 
assessments of PA and NA, respectively. Participants rated the positivity and 
negativity of their current mood on two separate 0-100% scales (e.g., How positive is 
your mood right now?). The two single-items were preferred over the PANAS for 
repeated measurement pre/post manipulation to reduce task burden. For 
rudimentary validation, baseline scores on the brief mood items were compared to 
baseline PANAS scores. PA and NA brief mood items demonstrated significant 
correlation with PANAS PA, r (261) = .43, p < .001, and NA, r (261) = .54, p < .001, 
respectively. 
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 Engagement and technical difficulties questions. Items evaluating 
participant engagement and technical difficulty during study completion were 
included for data-screening purposes. 
Manipulation 
 The thought speed and variability manipulations replicated Pronin and 
colleagues’ methodology (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006). A 2x2 
factorial design was employed: thought speed (fast/slow) X thought variability 
(varied/repetitive). Participants were allocated to one of four manipulation conditions. 
In each condition, participants read 63 neutral statements presented in a video 
produced using Microsoft Powerpoint. Thought speed was manipulated by speed of 
statement presentation: either fast (40ms per letter) or slow (170ms per letter). The 
interval between statements was 320ms in the fast condition and 4,000ms in the 
slow condition. Thought variability was manipulated by presenting either a non-
repeating sequence of 63 neutral statements (varied thought) or presenting the same 
three statements 21 times (repetitive thought). Multiple versions of the repetitive 
condition, with different sets of three statements, were employed across participants 
to prevent content effects. 
 Thought speed manipulation check. A single-item utilised by Pronin and 
Wegner (2006) was employed to evaluate change in perceived thought speed 
resultant from the manipulation. Participants rated their current speed of thought on 
a 9-point likert-scale (e.g., What do you feel is the speed of your thought right now? 
1 = very slow; 9 = very fast). The original item wording was modified to enable 
repeated employment pre/post manipulation. 
Procedure 
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 Ethical approval was awarded by the departmental ethics committee. 
Participants completed the study online. Following informed consent, participants 
completed demographic details and baseline questionnaires – the order of the latter 
was randomised. Participants then completed the pre-manipulation AST before 
being allocated to one of four manipulation conditions. Allocation to manipulation 
condition was determined by the pseudorandom number generator function of the 
online study software (qualtrics.com), which guarantees relatively equal numbers 
between conditions. Post-manipulation questionnaires and AST were then 
administered. Thought speed was assessed at four points across the course of the 
study – Figure 1. 
The study concluded with engagement and technical difficulties questions and 
a relaxation video aimed to counteract any residual effects of the manipulation. 
Participants were provided with a full study debrief. 
[INSERT FIG 1 HERE]  
Data-screening and Reduction  
 The original dataset (N = 603) was screened and reduced to include 
participants who completed all study components within specific time parameters 
(e.g., no longer than 1 ½ hours; and remained on the manipulation video webpage 
for a set minimum time period2). The final data set consisted of 263 participants. To 
reduce the influence of extreme data points, dependent variables were assessed for 
outliers, which were replaced using the Winsorising approach.  
                                                          
2 Participant time on webpage ≥ 138.6secs (i.e., 90% of the shortest manipulation 
video). 
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T-tests explored baseline differences between participants recruited from the 
university participant pool and the remaining sample in the final dataset. The 
adjusted t-test statistic was consulted where Levene’s test indicated unequal 
variances, as was the case for PANAS NA and both brief mood items. No significant 
baseline differences were found (ts ≤ .87; ps ≥ .388), with the exception of threat 
interpretation score, t(261) = 2.68, p = .008. Consequently, the sample was 
collapsed for analysis; however, potential differences between the participant pool 
subgroup and full sample were considered when analysing threat interpretation data. 
Data Transformation 
 Where data violated statistical test assumptions (e.g., Levene’s test) 
standardised residuals were consulted and/or square-root transformations applied. 
Subsequently, transformed data were utilised when this action improved model fit. 
Untransformed data were utilised when fit was found to be acceptable or unimproved 
by transformation. Instances where test assumptions were violated and model fit 
could not be improved are highlighted within the results. 
Results 
Baseline Descriptive Information and Comparisons 
 Descriptive information for all measures was compiled – Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Baseline comparisons were conducted to assess participant equivalence 
between the manipulation conditions. Between-groups univariate ANOVAs were 
employed to investigate baseline differences between the four conditions on each 
dependent variable. No significant difference was demonstrated between 
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experimental conditions on these measures (Fs ≤ 1.84, ps ≥ .141), with the 
exception of single-item NA, F(3, 259), p = .031, p2 = .03. However, baseline scores 
were accounted for in all subsequent analyses of the dependent variables (including 
NA), either as covariate or repeated-measures design. Consequently, this finding did 
not compromise the following results. 
Manipulation Check 
The impact of the experimental manipulation on perceived thought speed was 
assessed through repeated-measures ANOVA for slow and fast thought conditions, 
respectively. Mauchly’s test indicated violation of assumption of sphericity (slow 
thought speed, X2(5) = 114.68, p < .001; fast thought speed, X2(5)= 31.84, p < .001). 
Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity are reported as the corrected 
degrees of freedom. 
Analyses demonstrated significantly decreased thought speed in the slow 
manipulation, F(1.96, 250.59) = 15.09, p < .001, p2 = .11, and increased thought 
speed in the fast manipulation, F(23.67, 354.66) = 21.87, p < .001, p2 = .14. Simple 
contrasts revealed that the initial effect size (between assessment point 1-2) was 
large for the slow manipulation (p2 = .14), and larger still for the fast manipulation 
(p2 = .24). In both conditions, the manipulation effect remained significant at 
assessment point 3 (p < .001), but decreased in effect size and returned to pre-
manipulation state by assessment point 4 (Fs ≤ 1.22, ps ≥ .272). 
Primary Research Question: Associations between Mental Motion and 
Symptoms of Mania and Anxiety 
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 The study was concerned with whether manipulation of thought speed and 
variability influenced psychological state consistent with predictions based on the 
model of mental motion. Of primary interest were between-condition differences in 
symptoms associated with mania and anxiety assessed via self-report and threat 
interpretation. To explore the primary predictions, a series of 2x2 ANCOVAs were 
conducted: thought speed (fast/slow) X thought variability (varied/repetitive). The 
post-manipulation score (assessment point 2/3) on the symptom of interest was 
entered as the dependent variable. Pre-manipulation score (assessment point 1) 
was entered as a covariate to account for baseline symptom level. ANCOVA was 
preferred over alternative tests as it accounts for between-condition differences at 
baseline, is a powerful test well suited to the study design (Vickers & Altman, 2001), 
and is consistent with comparable study analyses (Yang et al., 2014). All subsequent 
reported means are ANCOVA-produced adjusted means – Table 3. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 These analyses provided assessment of differences between manipulation 
conditions. Where significant between-group effects were found, repeated-measures 
ANOVA were employed to establish the direction and effect size within respective 
manipulation conditions pre-to-post manipulation. For example, if ANCOVA 
demonstrated significant difference between fast and slow thought speed conditions 
for a dependent variable, then change in that dependent variable across assessment 
points 1-2 was subsequently assessed within fast and slow conditions, respectively, 
by conducting separate repeated-measures ANOVAs for each condition. 
Hypothesis one: Self-report symptoms of mania and anxiety. ANCOVA 
supported the predicted association between the mania symptom ‘activation’ and 
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increased thought speed and variability. As predicted, activation level was 
significantly higher in the fast thought condition (M = 12.6, SE = .34), compared to 
slow (M = 10.0, SE = .34), F(1, 258) = 30.20, p < .001, p2 = .11. Furthermore, 
activation level was significantly higher in the variable thought condition (M = 11.9, 
SE = .34), compared to repetitive (M = 10.6, SE = .35), F(1, 258) = 7.41, p = .007, 
p2 = .03.  
Assessment of symptom change pre-to-post manipulation within fast and slow 
thought speed conditions, respectively, clarified these findings.  The repeated-
measures ANOVAs demonstrated that activation level significantly increased when 
manipulation induced fast thought speed, F(1, 133), 36.32, p <.001, p2 = .21, but did 
not significantly change when thought speed was slowed, F(1, 128) = .79, p = .375, 
p2 = .01. Similarly, within the thought variability conditions, only variable thought 
demonstrated within-group change. Activation increased when variable thought was 
induced, F(1, 135) = 19.62, p < .001, p2 = .13, but not when thought was repetitive, 
F(1, 126) = .50, p = .482, p2 < .01. 
Contrary to prediction, ANCOVA demonstrated no significant differences in 
anxiety symptoms (measured by STAI-sf) between manipulation conditions. No 
significant main effects were demonstrated between thought speed, F(1, 258) = 1.02, 
p = .314, p2 < .001, or thought variability conditions, F(1, 258) = .23, p = .636, p2 < 
.01.   
Contrary to the predicted combinational role of thought speed and variability in 
differentiating manic and anxious states, the interaction term (Speed X Variability) 
was non-significant for both activation, F(1, 258) = 1.08, p = .3, p2 < .01., and 
anxiety level, F(1, 258) = .05, p = .826, p2 < .01. 
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Hypotheses two and three: Objective symptoms of mania and anxiety. 
Contrary to prediction, no evidence of condition-specific differences in threat 
interpretation (measured by AST) was found between manipulation conditions. 
ANCOVA main effects were non-significant for thought speed, F(1 258) = 1.43, p = 
.234, p2 = .01, and variability, F(1 258) = 1.40, p = .238, p2 = .01. Their interaction 
term was also non-significant, F(1 258) = .19, p = .660, p2 < .01.  
As significant difference in baseline threat interpretation scores were found 
between participants recruited through the university participant pool and those not, 
the ANCOVA outlined above was repeated with these two groups included as a 
covariate. The results remained non-significant, Fs ≤ 1.42, ps ≥ .241. 
Secondary Research Question: Associations between Mental Motion and 
Affective State 
Of secondary interest were the predicted differences in affective state 
dependent on thought speed and variability. The analytic approach employed for the 
primary research question was repeated with single-item PA and NA as dependent 
variables: 1) ANCOVA3 assessing differences between manipulation conditions, and 
                                                          
3 Where Levene’s test was significant in ANCOVA, square-root data 
transformation was applied. This action was taken for single-item PA. Transformation 
exacerbated rather than resolved the violation for PA and did not improve model fit. 
Consequently, untransformed data were utilised in this instance. Furthermore, the 
single-item NA ANCOVA and repeated-measures ANOVA for slow thought 
conditions demonstrated evidence of poorer model fit, which was not resolvable by 
transformation. Consequently, to improve reliability, PA and NA results should be 
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2) repeated-measures ANOVA to assess within-condition change pre-to-post 
manipulation. 
Hypotheses four and five: Affective state. Consistent with prediction, 
ANCOVA demonstrated significant differences between thought speed conditions for 
both positive, F(1, 258) = 5.56, p = .019, p2 = .02, and negative affect, F(1, 258) = 
4.33, p = .038, p2 = .02. Participants engaged in fast thought reported significantly 
higher levels of PA (M = 61.43, SE = 1.45) and lower levels of NA (M = 29.05, SE = 
1.56), compared to the slow condition (Mpositive affect = 56.54, SE = 1.48; Mnegative affect = 
33.69, SE = 1.58). 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs assessing within-group change pre-to-post 
manipulation within the slow thought speed condition demonstrated significant 
decrease in PA, F (1, 128) = 20.23, p <.001, p2 = .14, and increase in NA, F (1, 128) 
= 4.81, p = .030, p2 = .04. No significant changes were demonstrated in the fast 
thought condition for in either PA, F(1, 133) = 1.22, p = .271, p2 = .01, or NA, F(1, 
133) = 3.26, p = .073, p2 = .02. 
Contrary to prediction, no differences were found between the thought 
variability conditions for either PA, F(1, 258) = .62, p = .432, p2 < .01, or NA,  F(1, 
258) = .09, p = .766, p2 < .01. Furthermore, no significant interactions (Speed X 
Variability) were demonstrated (Fs ≤ .46, ps ≥ .497). 
                                                          
considered with reference to related study findings (e.g., Pronin & Jacobs, 2008; 
Yang et al., 2014). 
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Mood State Classification  
ISS subscales were employed to generate mood state classifications. 
Participants were dichotomously categorised as meeting criteria for each of the 
following categories, respectively: momentary (hypo)mania, depression, euthymia, 
and mixed-state. Participants were categorised pre and post manipulation. As 
categorisation included manic and depressive states, the subsequent analyse were 
relevant to both primary (mania symptoms) and secondary (affective state) research 
questions.  
Four logistic regressions were conducted – one for each mood state category. 
Participant mood state post-manipulation was entered as the dependent variable. To 
account for baseline mood, pre-manipulation mood state was entered in the first step 
as a covariate. Thought speed, thought variability, and their interaction term (Speed 
X Variability) were entered as predictive variables in the second step. Model fit was 
good for prediction of (hypo)mania only, consequently the poorer fit of the remaining 
models should be borne in mind. 
Inclusion of the additional mental motion variable predictors produced a 
significant model against constant only models for (hypo)mania and depression – 
Table 4. The inclusion of the additional predictors in step two demonstrated 
significantly improved prediction over baseline covariate for the (hypo)mania and 
depression models. In both models, only thought speed was found to be a significant 
additional predictor. Table 4 results indicate that individuals were: 1) more likely to 
meet criteria for (hypo)mania in the fast thought speed condition compared to slow, 
and 2) more likely to meet criteria for depression in the slow thought speed condition 
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compared to fast. However, neither thought variability nor the interaction term, 
significantly predicted association with either (hypo)mania or depression. 
Finally, no significant improvement in model prediction above constant and 
baseline covariate was demonstrated in step two models for mixed-state, X2(3) = 
7.13, p = .068, or euthymia, X2(3) = 3.67, p = .299.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Discussion 
 The present study found supportive evidence for some, but not all, aspects of 
the mental motion model (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008). The findings most consistently 
support the mental motion account of manic and affective states. Relationship 
between mental motion and anxiety was unsupported however, suggesting that the 
theory requires further development. 
Mental Motion and Symptoms of Mania and Anxiety 
 Based on the mental motion account it was predicted that specific changes in 
thought speed and variability would be associated with increases in mania and 
anxiety symptoms, respectively (hypotheses one-three). The predictions were 
partially supported. Predominantly the mental motion account of manic thinking was 
supported. Both fast and variable thought were independently associated with 
increased self-reported activation levels, a core symptom of mania (Mansell & 
Pedley, 2008). Furthermore, ISS mood state categorisation demonstrated that 
thought speed predicted momentary (hypo)manic state. However, the predicted 
between-group differences in anxiety symptoms dependent on mental motion were 
not observed. Crucially, no support for a combinational influence of thought speed 
and variability was demonstrated for any dependent variable.  
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The findings were consistent with previous evidence of increased mania 
symptoms (e.g., felt levels of energy, power, creativity, and risk-taking) in fast 
compared to slow thought manipulations (Chandler & Pronin, 2012; Pronin & 
Wegner, 2006). Thought variability was found to have a significant influence on 
activation level, whereas in the past a relationship between this variable and ‘felt 
energy’ did not meet the significance threshold, p = .07 (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008). 
Collectively, the results support a causal, as well as symptomatic, conception of the 
thought speed and variability associated with mania. The evidence suggests that 
rapid stimuli presentation or variable stimuli presentation results in a state of 
activation. There is potential evolutionary advantage to this relationship as real-world 
situations requiring rapid processing of information arguably require that the 
individual is alert and ready for action in the face of potential threat (Pronin, 2013). 
Arguably, the need to think fast is often accompanied by the need to act fast. The 
effects of thought variability may serve a similar evolutionary function. Situations in 
which information is unrelated and consistently changing are difficult to predict, so 
may also necessitate alertness.  
A generic impact of mental motion on activation appears evident. Activation is 
a core component of mania. However, increased speed and variability does not 
necessitate clinical levels of mania. Consequently, further factors require 
consideration to clarify what determines outcome. Factors considered may include 
individual differences in reactivity to affective change (Gruber, 2011) and the 
influence of appraisal of internal states (Mansell, Morrison, Reid, Lowens, & Tai, 
2007). 
 Additionally, it was predicted that change in threat perception consistent with 
decreased threat sensitivity would be evident alongside increased self-reported 
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activation. However, the evidence did not support this prediction. This study 
component was acknowledged as exploratory given the mixed evidence of threat 
sensitivity in mania (Carver & Johnson, 2009; Garcia-Blanco, Salmeron, Perea, & 
Livianos, 2014) and that existing interpretation bias research has predominantly 
focused on valence, not threat (e.g., Lex, Hautzinger, & Meyer, 2011; Thomas, 
Bentall, Knowles, & Tai, 2009). Consequently, the study results cannot be 
considered conclusive evidence that mania-consistent processing biases are not 
induced by manipulated changes in thought speed and variability. Further 
investigation is required. 
 Contrary to prediction, anxiety symptoms (self-report and threat interpretation) 
were not related to differences in thought speed and/or variability. Whilst the pace of 
worried thinking in anxiety has been suggested to demonstrate similarities with 
manic thinking (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008), anxiety also frequently demonstrates co-
morbidity with depression (Hirschfeld, 2001) – a condition characterised by slower, 
ruminative thinking. It has been suggested that anxious worried thought has 
differently themed content to depressed rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008). It may be that association between mental motion and anxiety 
cannot be accurately observed or understood without considering thought content. 
 Critically, no evidence was found to support the predicted differentiating role 
of combined thought speed and variability. This combinational effect has been 
proposed to be potentially involved in clarifying similarities between some features of 
anxious and manic thinking styles (Pronin, 2013; Pronin & Jacobs, 2008). Whereas 
Pronin and Jacobs’ (2008) study reported that the combinational effect resulted in 
significant differences between feelings of anxiety compared to depression. This 
study found no significant differences when investigating anxiety levels 
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independently. Consequently, this study failed to support the proposition that the 
variables of mental motion exert a content-independent combinational influence over 
psychological state on any of the variables investigated (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008). It is 
possible that the influences of thought speed and variability are solely independent. 
However, it is also possible that a more nuanced conception of thought variability is 
required. For example, the conception may incorporate the conceptual thread and 
progression of thoughts (Mason & Bar, 2011). Thoughts may be variable and non-
repeating, whilst also being related through conception associations. This conception 
is consistent manic episodes as potentially including a “flight of ideas” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Further research may include consideration of 
thematic association in the conception of thought variability.  
Mental Motion and Affective State 
 As predicted (hypothesis four-five), affective experience was influenced by 
changes in thought speed. Consistent with multiple previous studies (e.g., Chandler 
& Pronin, 2012; Pronin et al., 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006; Yang et al., 2014), fast 
thought was associated with higher levels of PA and lower levels of NA compared to 
slow thought. Although within-group change pre-to-post manipulation was consistent 
with previous results that slow thought may cause decreased PA, this study did not 
replicate previous findings that fast thought causes significantly increased PA 
(Pronin et al., 2008 – study six; Yang et al., 2014). However, a recent study that 
stratified results by depression level only found significant PA change in individuals 
with mild-moderate depression, whereas change did not meet the threshold for 
statistical significance in those with minimal or no depression (Yang et al., 2014). 
Consequently, these findings may suggest that the affective influence of thought 
speed partially depends on current affective experience (e.g., depression level); and 
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that, in the general population, slow thought speed demonstrates the strongest 
influence over mood, decreasing PA and increasing NA. Consistent with this finding, 
ISS mood state categorisation demonstrated that thought speed predicts depression. 
The evidence further supports possible relation between thought speed and 
depression. 
 Contrary to predictions, affective state was not significantly influenced by 
thought variability. Previous research which has found an affective influence of 
thought variability often includes consideration of thought content (Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1993; McLaughlin et al., 2007) or conceptual interrelationship between 
thoughts (Mason & Bar, 2011). The present study findings may further indicate the 
need to consider thought content when investigating the impact of thought variability 
(Watkins, 2008). 
Clinical Implications and Future Research 
 This research adds to emergent recommendations that psychological 
intervention may benefit from inclusion of components assessing and manipulating 
thought speed and variability (e.g., Bar, 2009; Pronin, 2013; Pronin & Jacobs, 2008). 
A body of literature is demonstrating that thinking style, as well as content, can 
causally influence psychological experience. This influence may broaden our 
understanding of the mechanisms of psychological difficulties, such as mania (Pronin 
& Wegner, 2006) and depression (Yang et al., 2014). Furthermore, this study 
extends a developing field considering the value of experimental manipulations as 
interventions as well as research methodologies (Hertel & Mathews, 2011). 
Inclusion of therapeutic components targeting mental motion associated with 
specific psychological difficulties may broaden established cognitive-behavioural 
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intervention (Hofmann, Asnaani, Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012). For instance, by 
increasing thought speed to improve mood in mild-moderate depression (Yang et al., 
2014) and, potentially, by inducing slower, more repetitive thought to reduce 
activation reinforcing factors in individuals with mania.  
Furthermore, as these thought processes appear potentially causally related 
to manifestation of mania symptoms, self-monitoring of thought speed and variability 
may enhance awareness of current relapse vulnerability and facilitate early 
intervention (Morriss et al., 2007). Indeed, thought speed (e.g., racing thoughts) is a 
common prodromal symptom in bipolar disorder (Lam & Wong, 2005). Regular brief 
assessment of thought speed and variability may enable individuals to be aware of 
increasing relapse risk factors and engage in targeted intervention to revert thinking 
to a less elevated pace and level of variability. This advancement is consistent with 
guidance for relapse prevention in mania (National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence, 2006) and may potentially provide additional avenues for support, where 
currently psychosocial recommendations are limited. 
It is stressed, however, that further research is required before intervention 
development. Investigation in clinical populations is necessary to ascertain if, where, 
and when manipulation of mental motion provides effective therapeutic change. 
Existing research suggests that manipulating mental motion may not have the same 
outcome in severe as in moderate difficulties (Yang et al., 2014).  
Limitations 
 The present study has a number of limitations. First, the study was conducted 
online rather than in a laboratory. Online research raises concerns regarding 
experimental control and comparability to existing lab-based evidence. However, 
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online experiments have demonstrated equivalence with lab-based experiments 
(Germine et al., 2012). Furthermore, a variation on this study’s methodology has 
been successfully employed online previously (Yang et al., 2014).  
 Second, consistent with previous research, ISS: activation was utilised as a 
measure of a symptom of mania. However, increased levels of activity may also 
present in other difficulties (e.g., Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder). 
Consequently, whilst levels of activation and positive affect provide preliminary 
insight into potential mania symptoms, they are not equivalent to (hypo)mania. 
Future research may expand the present study to include a broader, more 
representative range of mania symptoms. 
Third, a control condition was not included. Although within-group change 
potentially provides some indication of the impact of deviation of thought speed and 
variability from ‘normal’ levels, further investigation may include a non-manipulated 
comparison control. 
Fourth, this study included self-reported thought speed as a manipulation 
check, but a similar thought variability measure was not included. Although 
consistent with previous protocol (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008), the omission 
compromises evaluation of the effectiveness of the variability manipulation. 
Positively, the significant differences relating to thought variability conditions suggest 
the manipulation was effective. However, future research should include a specific, 
repeated measurement to ascertain manipulation effect size and duration. 
Furthermore, the manipulation check employed was self-report, which is vulnerable 
to social desirability effects. Inclusion of objective assessment of manipulations (e.g., 
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assessing thought speed through response-time in neutral decision-making tasks) 
would improve future research.  
 Fifth, in replicating the previous manipulation protocol, manipulation tasks 
between experimental conditions within this study varied in length. Consequently, the 
factor of time elapsing may have influenced the results. Furthermore, extraneous 
variables potentially influenced by the manipulation (e.g., irritation or boredom 
associated with repetitive or unstimulating tasks) were not assessed. Consequently, 
their potential contribution to effects observed cannot be discounted. However, 
relative consistency between present findings and investigation utilising alternative 
manipulation tasks of varying method and duration (e.g., Pronin et al., 2008) affords 
confidence that mental motion variables are contributing to the observed effects. 
 Sixth, the study utilised a convenience, predominantly student sample 
recruited online and with notable attrition, which may have implications for 
generalisability. Some demographic differences were observed between study 
completers and non-completers; however, performance on dependent variables 
appeared comparable, with the exception of higher PANAS measured negative 
affective in non-completers. Consistency between the present study and previous 
research may support generalisability. However, further replication in different 
populations remains advisable. Additionally, as the present study did not employ a 
clinical sample, generalisability to a clinical population cannot be assumed. 
Conclusion 
 The present study extends understanding of the independent effects of 
thought speed and variability on psychological state, specifically focusing of 
symptoms of mania and anxiety. The study findings suggest that, in its current form, 
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the model of mental motion may be most relevant to understanding changes in 
manic and affective states, rather than anxiety. Faster and more varied thought 
independently contribute to increases in activation, whereas affect appears most 
significantly influenced slowing thought speed. No significant differences in threat 
interpretation attributable to changes in mental motion were observed. Critically, the 
study findings did not support the proposed combinational effects of mental motion 
variables in differentiating manic and anxious states. Consequently, the theory 
requires further development, particularly if anxiety is to be incorporated. Future 
research may aim to generate a more comprehensive theoretical account, 
incorporating other features of thought, such as content and relationship with that 
content (e.g., Gillanders et al., 2014; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). 
In conclusion, the specificity of the influence exerted by thought speed and 
variability on psychological state may prove useful for assessment and therapeutic 
intervention. However, understanding of the specific influence of these variables 
requires further confirmation and clarification, particularly in clinical populations. 
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Table 1 
Participant Demographic Information (Including Comparison between Final Sample Participants and Study Non-completers) 
Characteristic  % (unless specified) Chi-square and 
t-tests 
Final sample 
n = 263 
Non-completers 
n = 304  
(except country, n = 300) 
Sex     
 Male 27.4 35.9 X2(1) = 4.67, 
 Female 72.6 64.1 p = .031 
Age     
 Mean (SD) 27.4 years (11.2) 30.0 years (13.3) t(564.52) = 2.55, 
 Range 51.4 years 81.2 years p = .011 
Marital status     
 Single 52.9 52.3 X2(4) = 3.50,  
 In a couple, not married 27.0 24.3 p = .478 
 Married 16.3 18.4  
 Divorced 2.7 4.6  
 Widowed 1.1 0.3  
Ethnicity     
 White 85.6 76.6 N/A+ 
 Chinese 4.2 2.3  
 Other 10.2 21.1  
Country     
 UK 62.7 42.3 N/A+ 
 USA 25.1 40.7  
 Canada 4.2 4.0  
 Other 8 13  
First language     
 English 89 86.8 X2(1) = .60, 
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 Other 29 13.2 p = .439 
Employment status     
 Full-time employed 22.4 27.3 X2(6) = 36.32,  
 Part-time employed 6.8* 18.1* p < .001 
 Full-time student 58.9* 36.5*  
 Part-time student 1.5 3.3  
 Unemployed 7.6 8.9  
 Do not work due to 
disability 
1.1 3.6  
 Retired 1.5 2.3  
Diagnosis of mental 
health difficulties 
    
 No 72.6 72.0 X2(4) = 9.34,  
 Depression 16 12.2 p = .053 
 Anxiety 7.2 6.3  
 Bipolar disorder .8 4.3  
 Other 3.4 5.3  
*std. residuals ≥ +/- 2.0; +N/A: Chi-square tests not appropriate as the number of expected counts with a value less than five exceeded 25%. 
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Table 2 
Baseline Raw Data Descriptive Information for Total Sample and Stratified by 
Manipulation Condition 
   
 Manipulation condition: 







(n = 63) 
 
Slow, varied 
(n = 66) 
 
Fast, repetitive 
(n = 64) 
 
Fast, varied 
(n = 70) 
 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
(N = 263) 
      
STAI-sf 12.21 (3.92) 11.36 (4.02) 11.63 (4.10) 12.80 (4.05) 12.01 (4.04) 
ISS: activation 127.84 (103.23) 122.02 (86.35) 142.06 (104.44) 116.16 (88.04) 126.73 (95.55) 
ISS: wellbeing 146.19 (67.46) 157.26 (60.80) 167.59 (64.72) 148.11 (57.18) 154.69 (62.72) 
PANAS PA 24.32 (8.50) 26.67 (8.74) 25.72 (8.12) 24.26 (7.27) 25.23 (8.18) 
PANAS NA 15.10 (4.66) 15.61 (5.24) 15.53 (5.29) 15.87 (5.26) 15.54 (5.10) 
Single-item PA 61.27 (21.57) 67.23 (23.53) 65.84 (22.38) 59.29 (22.87) 63.35 (22.73) 
Single-item NA 29.76 (23.75) 25.26 (22.67)* 30.94 (22.44) 37.36 (26.09)* 30.94 (24.10) 
AST Threat 20.76 (5.41) 21.59 (5.92) 21.22 (5.85) 21.51 (6.47) 21.28 (5.91) 
* Tukey’s post-hoc analysis revealed that variable slow and variable fast manipulation conditions 






RUNNING HEADER: IMPACT OF THOUGHT SPEED AND VARIABILITY  40 
Table 3 
Summary of Estimated Means with 95% Confidence Intervals from ANCOVA Relating to Symptoms of Anxiety, Mania, and 
Affective State 
     
Dependent variable (post-manipulation) Thought speed  Thought variability  
       
Estimated Mean [95% CI] Slow Fast Sig. Repetitive Varied Sig. 

































































   
                              Interaction 
        
Estimated Mean [95% CI] Slow, repetitive Slow, varied   Fast, repetitive Fast, varied Sig. 























































n = Square-root transformed data; Estimated means = Adjusted group means accounting for dependent variable pre-manipulation score as covariate. 
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Table 4 
Logistic Regression Exploring Mood State Predicted by Thought Speed and 
Variability 
    
Dependent 
variable 
Predictors  95% CI for exp b 
      
  B (SE) Lower CI exp b Upper CI 
(Hypo)mania Constant -1.84*** (.35)  .16  
 Baseline ISS mania 
classification 
2.22*** (.35) 4.66 9.19 18.11 
 Thought speed 1.07* (.44) 1.23 2.90 6.83 
 Thought variability .21 (.46)  .50 1.23 3.01 
 Speed X Variability -.07 (.60) .29 .93 3.01 
R2 = .18 (Hosmer & Lemeshow); .21 (Cox & Snell); .29 (Nagelkerke) 
Model X2(4) = 61.71, , p < .001; Step X2(3) = 12.70, p = .005 
 
Depression Constant -1.21 (.32)  .30  
 Baseline ISS depression 
classification 
-2.70*** (.38) 7.13 14.93 31.30 
 Thought speed -.94* (.48)  .15 .39 .99 
 Thought variability -.09 (.43) .39 .92 2.13 
 Speed X Variability -.42 (.68) .17 .66 2.48 
R2 = .23 (Hosmer & Lemeshow); .24 (Cox & Snell); .35 (Nagelkerke) 
Model X2(4) = 71.77, p < .001; Step X2(3) = 13.00, p = .005 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; *p < .05  























Figure 1. Experimental design and procedural flow.  
Baseline assessment 
State symptom measurement: 
a. Mania (ISS) b. Anxiety (STAI-sf) c. Mood (PANAS + mood items) 
 
Thought speed assessment (Assessment point 1) 
Thought speed and content manipulation 
Pseudo-randomised allocation 
Condition four 
Fast thought speed 
Repetitive content 
(n = 64) 
Thought speed assessment (Assessment point 2) 
Post manipulation assessment 
State symptom measurement: 
a. Mania (ISS) b. Anxiety (STAI-sf) c. Mood (mood items) 
Thought speed assessment (Assessment point 3) 
Threat interpretation assessment 
Counterbalanced presentation order 
Condition three 
Slow thought speed 
Repetitive content 
(n = 63) 
Condition two 
Fast thought speed 
Variable content 
(n = 70) 
Condition one 
Slow thought speed 
Variable content 





Threat interpretation assessment 





Thought speed assessment (Assessment point 4) 
Engagement & technical difficulties questions 
Relaxation task followed by participant debrief 
